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Summary 
Globalization and free information have been beneficial for customers, but also have a down side for 
firms because customers are getting more demanding, prices are under pressure, competition is 
increasing and product life-cycles are shortening. One of the instruments that companies use to 
remain competitive is target costing: determining the targeted sales price of a product or service which 
a customer is willing to pay, minus the profit the firm wants to (re)attain.  
 
Based on existing literature, characteristics were identified which influence target costing during 
product-level costing.    Product level target costing is used to set tight, but realistic pressure to reduce 
product cost and is influenced by transaction characteristics (Cooper and Slagmulder, 1997): the 
number of products in line, the frequency of redesign, the degree of innovation, the product 
complexity, the upfront investments and the duration of product development. Target costing is, 
however, not limited to the boundaries of the firm which makes it also interesting to see how the 
process affects inter-firm relations and how it is used to establish control. In order to study how target 
costing affects the buyer-supplier relationship, factors like information asymmetry, bargaining power, 
risk and dependency on each other and the level of trust in the relationship were taken into 
consideration. To see how control is affected, factors like focus of control, tightness of control, contract 
type and control mechanism were studied. 
 
The model that has been developed here, shows to what extent target costing is used in buyer-
supplier relationships and how control is established in the relationships. In the model three patterns 
were distinguished: transaction-based, partnership-based or strategic-partnership-based. The model 
was tested by conducting a single case study with multiple units of analysis (embedded). The case 
involves a midsize, global company, operating in a highly volatile technology market, with around 1500 
suppliers. Four suppliers were chosen for this evaluation due to time and monetary constraints. 
 
In general all researched relationships largely fitted in the transactional and (strategic) partnership-
based control patterns. Supplier A fitted in the transactional-based control pattern, Supplier B and C 
fitted the (strategic) partnership-based control pattern and supplier D fitted the strategic partnership-
based control pattern.  
 
Some deviations from the model were visible in practice. These findings indicated some of the 
dynamics which occur in practice. Those observations, however, do not reject the developed model, 
but confirm how relationships change over time and how they move between the different patterns in 
the developed model. These findings confirm that the model also supports business dynamics. 
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After reviewing the final results this research shows that: 
 Target costing is less extensively used in transactional-based control patterns; 
 Target costing can be used to reduce information asymmetry; 
 Goodwill trust is essential for maintaining long-term relationships;  
 Goodwill trust is important when developing new products; 
 Number of product in lines has limited impact on control pattern; 
 Product development significantly impacts control; 
 Control is not fixed, but dynamic over time; 
 Control in inter-firm relationships using target costing changes gradually in time; 
 
Although the developed model will hold true in circumstances similar to the context described, the 
scale of this research is limited and more research is desired to see whether the model holds true in 
other circumstances (i.e. in other firms and in other markets). That research could then determine how 
tightness of control can be measured and interpreted, how the actual numbers of redesign, the 
degrees of innovation, the amount of upfront investments and the product development stage 
influences control in inter-firm relationships. 
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1 Introduction 
World globalization through information technology has significantly increased the competitive 
environment in which we live. The world has become one market place where people can easily 
access and share (free) information about products, services, and where to buy them against the 
lowest costs. This has made customers more aware what the market has to offer. The free 
information, however, also has a down side for firms because customers are getting more demanding, 
prices are under pressure, competition is increasing and product life-cycles are decreasing. 
 
In order to satisfy customers firms are forced to review their strategy and optimize usage of resources. 
Methodologies which had been used thus far to manage profits and return on investments (i.e. cost-
plus methodology) were no longer meeting demands. In order to (re)gain competitive advantage target 
costing was developed as a solution for developing and introducing new products. Target costing is an 
instrument to reduce costs and optimize all resources along the entire supply chain (Ahmed et al., 
1997; Zsidisin and Ellram, 2001; Lockamy and Smith, 2000; Welfle and Keityka, 2000; Shank and 
Fisher, 1999). Others argue that target costing focuses less on cost and considers customer 
requirements to be the primary cost driver (Lockamy and Smith, 2000). The main concept of target 
costing, however, consists of determining the targeted sales price of a product or service which a 
customer is willing to pay, minus the profit the firm wants to (re)attain. This will result in the targeted 
cost the company needs to establish in order to successfully develop and introduce (new) products 
which satisfy the customer and which (re)attain the targeted profit. This methodology is often used in 
production environments which face competition, in order to reduce cost, optimize resources and 
satisfy customers. 
 
The target costing process can be broken into three major steps (Cooper and Slagmulder, 1997): 
market-driven costing, product level costing and component level costing. The first step, market-driven 
costing is mainly influenced by the intensity of competition and the nature of the customer and is used 
to transmit customer and market requirements into the product (design) and establish the target costs 
by subtracting the target profit margin from the target selling price. In the product level costing step the 
target costs are translated to the individual building blocks or modules of the product in order to 
establish an intense, but realistic target for the product/module designers and suppliers. In the last 
step, component level costing, target costs are further divided into the product components in order to 
promote creativity and cost reductions. Especially the last two steps are often used by firms when 
outsourcing activities or products/component to independent firms. 
Outsourcing products and components, however, also requires more attention to the outsourcing 
relation in order to guarantee continuity and economic advantages in the long run.  
 
To optimize all resources along the entire supply chain, business organizations nowadays collaborate 
more and more to achieve common goals more effectively. In the literature these collaborations 
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between firms and external independent firms are also known as inter-firm relationships and these 
relationships are increasingly adopted by organizations as competitive tools (Tompkins, 2001). 
Various forms of inter-firm relationships have been studied in combination with supply chain 
(Mouritsen et al., 2001; Free, 2008), outsourcing (Anderson et al., 2000; Langfield-Smith and Smith, 
2003), joint-ventures (Groot and Merchant, 2000; Kamminga and Van der Meer-Kooistra, 2007; 
Emsley and Kidon, 2007) and networking (Mouritsen and Thrane, 2006).  
 
The involvement of external independent firms, however, also has a downside for the controlling 
function, because activities are no longer limited to boundaries of the firm which make the control 
aspects of the relationship more sophisticated and complex. Especially the increase of outsourcing 
non-core activities and supplier involvement in the early stages of product development add 
sophistication and complexity to the controlling environment. The increased attention towards 
management control in inter-firm relationships can also be found in the literature (Coletti et al., 2004; 
Das, 2001; Groot and Merchant, 2000; Hakansson and Lind 2004; Hansen and Hansen, 2001; 
Kamminga and Van der Meer-Kooistra, 2007; Meira, 2009; Nooteboom, 2004; Van der Meer-Kooistra 
and Vosselman, 2000).  
 
Despite the extensive attention towards target costing, inter-firm relationships and to a lesser extent 
on inter-firm relationships control, there is no research about management control in inter-firm 
relationships using target costing as instrument. Therefore this paper wants to answer the question:  
 
How is control established in a buyer-supplier relationship using target costing? 
 
In order to do so the following questions will be addressed: 
 What can be said about target costing and inter-firm relationship management control 
considering  existing literature? 
 What can be said about the interactions between target costing, inter-firm relationship and 
management control? 
 What can be said about target costing and inter-firm relationship control when conducting case 
study research in practice? 
 What are the implications when confronting the theoretical model with case findings in practice? 
 
To answer the above questions a literature study is conducted to study the main elements in this 
research (Target costing and Inter-firm relationship control, especially in a buyer-supplier relationship). 
Based on transaction and relationship characteristics connected to the above elements different types 
of buyer-supplier relationships will be distinguished. Once these different types of buyer-supplier 
relationships have been distinguished I will review how the characteristics of these types affect control 
and how we can connect these buyer-supplier relationships to control patterns. 
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In the literature several types of control with inter-firm relationships patterns have already been 
developed. Kamminga and Van der Meer-Kooistra (2007), developed a model on how joint ventures 
apply control based on relationship and transaction characteristics. Their model consist of a content-
based control pattern, a consultation-based control pattern and a context-based control pattern.  
Dekker (2004) developed a model based on a strategic alliance between a buyer and a supplier of 
railway safety equipment and used concerns about the relationship and coordinating requirements to 
explain controlling aspects. His final model consists of an outcome based control mechanism, 
behavioral control mechanism and a social control mechanism. 
Van der Meer-Kooistra and Vosselman (2000) developed a model conducting case research in the 
field of industrial renovation and industrial maintenance in a buyer-supplier relationship. Their model 
consists of a market based control pattern, a bureaucracy based control pattern and a trust based 
control pattern.  
Although these models have some similarities there are also clear differences. In this research these 
models will be reviewed and it will be determined whether these models can also be applied to a 
buyer-supplier relationship using target costing as strategic instrument. 
 
I will confront the model with buyer-supplier relationships in practice and study how they exercise 
control in practice in order to coordinate activities. I will be doing this by conducting a single case 
study with multiple units of analysis within the semiconductor industry: The selected company is a 
world leading manufacturer in the semiconductor industry and it was selected for various reasons:  
 One case can be studied which includes multiple different relations; 
 it has outsourced several component and products; 
 it is a company with a world class finance system (in which control plays an important role and 
receives a lot of attention);  
 its control structure is very important to be able to deal with the extremely volatile market; 
 its staff was more than willing to cooperate to answer some of the questions which are needed 
to answer the issues formulated above. 
 
Several semi-structured interviews were held with the outsourcing firm to validate the different 
supplier-buyer relationship types and the control model. Secondly several semi-structured interviews 
were held with its suppliers in order to confront the model from the outsourcer as well as the 
outsourcee.  
 
Due to the competitive environment of the above company and its suppliers names and figures are 
restated. Leaving the names out of the case study and multiplying or dividing figures with a fixed rate, 
however, do not affect the case study or the results.  
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The paper consists of five chapters. 
The first chapter is this Introduction. In the second chapter we propose a control model for different 
buyer-supplier relationships using target costing based on existing literature. The third chapter will 
deal with the research methodology: how to study and answer the questions which are formulated in 
the introduction.  In the fourth chapter the results of the case study will be discussed. In the last 
chapter conclusions and recommendations are shared and explained. 
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2 Target costing and model development  
In this chapter I will develop a model of control in the context of buyer-supplier relationships using 
target costing as instrument by integrating transaction and relational characteristics. But first I will 
discuss the principles of target costing and its history in order to understand the target costing 
concept.  
2.1 Target costing 
Traditionally sales prices have been mainly based on (internal) production cost (cost-plus 
methodology), but as competition grew fiercer and profits came under pressure, companies looked for 
alternatives to increase customer competitiveness (See table 1.). This explains an increased focus on 
target costing, which some even claim to be the most important innovation over the past decades in 
management accounting (Carlsson, 2011). Some even claim that target costing is one of the strategic 
cost management approaches best suited to strengthen a company’s competitiveness in meeting 
today’s business challenges (Bonzemba, 2005). Nowadays target costing has been adopted by 
successful market leaders such as Mercedes, Kodak, Boeing, Chrysler, Goodyear, Sony, Toyota and 
many others (Nicolini et al., 2000), 
 
‘Cost-plus’  ‘Target costing’ 
- Costs determine price  - Price determines costs 
- Performance, quality and profit (and more rarely waste and inefficiency) are 
the focus of cost reduction 
 - Design is key to cost reduction, with costs managed out 
before they are incurred 
- Cost reduction is not customer driven  - Customer input guides identification of cost-reduction areas 
- Cost accountants are responsible for cost reductions  - Cross-functional teams manage costs 
- Suppliers involved late in design process   - Early involvement of suppliers 
- No focus on through-life cost   - Minimizes cost of ownership for client and producer 
- Supply chain only required to cut costs  - Involves supply chain in cost planning 
 
Table 1. Cost-plus and target costing compared (Nicolini et al. 2000) 
 
The earliest usage of this retrograde approach can be traced back to Ford in the United States in the 
beginning of the last century and in the development of the Volkswagen Beetle in Germany in the 
1930s (Shank, 1995; Cooper and Slagmulder, 1997; Feil et al., 2004). During the period of scarce 
resources after World War II a more full-fledged approach was used to successfully introduce new 
products against minimum product costs (Leahy, 1998). This technique became known as “value 
engineering” and was subsequently adopted by Japanese companies in order to withstand stiff 
competition within Japan (Feil, 2004).  
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In Japan the first use of this value engineering approach occurred at Toyota and was known as “genka 
kikaku”.  Later “genka kikaku” was translated into “target costing”, the term now used throughout the 
world (Feil, 2004). Although the initial application of target costing was limited to a few products and 
parts, major events in the early 1990s (Bursting of the economic bubble in 1990 and 1991, rise of the 
Japanese Yen against the U.S. Dollar and the long recession caused by a crisis in the financial sector)
 
extended target costing from a tool to manage suppliers to a management technique and full-fledged 
instrument to manage product development, product sourcing, customer satisfaction and long term 
profits, covering most areas in private companies as well as in charities and non-government 
organizations. 
 
The increased attention in target costing can also be traced back to the inadequate functioning of 
instruments which had been used so far like JIT (Just in Time) and TQM (Total Quality Management). 
Although companies were able to reduce costs significantly, the attention of these instruments is 
aimed at the period after product development, while approximately 80% of the fixed costs are 
determined before production. In order to be competitive again companies had to focus on product 
cost even before the product went into production. This explains why target costing has been adopted 
by a large number of major companies in the assembly, research and development, and 
manufacturing type industries. 
 
Although target costing is often seen as merely a cost management instrument when developing new 
products to maximize long term profits, the methodology has a broader focus. It is a program to 
reduce costs, which even begins at the concept phase of a new product, or before there are new 
products (Kato, 1993). The primary focus of target costing may be seen as a solution to minimize cost 
through optimal use of all resources along the entire supply chain. It also considers customer 
requirements such as price features and functionality to introduce new products successfully. 
 
Some even claim that the primary focus of target costing is customer requirements and less 
minimizing (supply chain) cost (Lockamy and Smith, 2000). But as stated by Kato (1993) target costing 
is not just a costing system; rather it is an activity which is aimed at reducing the life-cycle cost of new 
products, while ensuring quality, reliability and other customer requirements (e.g. functionality or price 
setting), by examining all ideas for cost reduction at the product planning, research and development 
stages (Kato, 1993). That those elements, customers and cost reduction, are important in the target 
costing principle can also be traced back to the target costing equation of Kato (1993): 
 
Expected Sales Price – Required Profit = Target cost for the product 
 
The expected sales price is the starting point for target costing (Kato, 1993) or, as stated by Ansari 
and Bell (1997), target costing starts by asking customers what they want and what they are willing to 
pay for the product and its functionalities. The expected sales price does not only include the cost for 
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manufacturing the products itself, but also contains a premium which the customer is willing to pay for 
the added value of the product. In the model of Cooper and Slagmulder (1997) this step is called 
market-driven costing. Market-driven costing is mainly influenced by the intensity of competition and 
the nature of the customer and is used to transmit customer and market requirements into the product 
(design). By comparing the target price with long-term business plans, a desired profit margin is then 
calculated which results in the establishment of a target cost by subtracting the target profit margin 
from the target selling price (Carlsson-Wall, 2011).  
Having established the target cost, a second step is called product-level target (Cooper and 
Slagmulder 1997). In this step the target costs are translated into the individual building blocks or 
modules of the product in order to analyze the cost gap, determine which steps are needed to obtain 
the target costs and establish an intense, but realistic target for the product/module designers and 
suppliers.  
Finally, the third step is called component-level target costing. In this last step target costs are further 
divided into the product components in order to promote creativity and cost reductions. This step often 
involves suppliers (Carlsson-Wall, 2011). An illustration of the process can be found in Figure 1: 
Target costing illustration.  
 
 
Sales price (manufacturing price + added value premium)
Price established by 
customers and or market 
based on a certain concept 
with certain functionality for a 
market segment and a 
certain volume
Targeted margin / profit Targeted cost
Actual cost
Product pre-calculated cost
None value added cost in 
design
None value added in supply 
chain
None value added cost
 
Figure 1. Target costing illustration 
2.2 Model development 
In the following four sections I develop a model of management control of buyer-supplier relationships 
using target costing. In the literature several models have already been developed using the 
Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) theory. These models will be used in order to distinguish different 
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buyer-supplier relationships and to determine how they affect control. I will be doing this by reviewing 
transactional and relational characteristics. However, before developing this model I will discuss the 
relevant transactional and relational characteristics in the context of buyer-supplier relationships using 
target costing.  
2.2.1 Buyer-supplier transaction characteristics  
The review of the transaction characteristics in the context of buyer-supplier relationships using target 
costing is mainly based on the research done by Cooper and Slagmulder (1997), who conducted an 
exploratory comparative analysis of the target costing process at six Japanese firms to identify factors 
which influence the target costing process. The details in the model make it very suitable to study 
control in buyer-supplier relationships using target costing.  The choice to use this model was arbitrary 
since the model of Van de Meer-Kooistra and Vosselman could have been used as well.”Therefore the 
model of Cooper and Slagmulder (1997) is used to study the transaction characteristics.  
 
As previously mentioned Cooper and Slagmulder (1997) broke the target costing process into three 
major steps: market-driven costing, product level costing and component level costing. For each step 
Cooper and Slagmulder identified which factors affect the target cost process. 
 Step 1: Market-driven costing 
 Intensity of competition 
 Nature of customer 
 Step 2: Product level 
 Product strategy 
 Characteristics of the product 
 Step 3: Component level costing 
 Supplier base  
The first step is mainly related to how the targeted sales prices and targeted profit are obtained in 
order to determine the targeted cost. This step has less influence on the buyer-supplier relationship 
and for this reason these characteristics are not discussed in this paper. Also the last factor, Supplier 
base, is not discussed here. Supplier base is characterized by the degree of horizontal integration, the 
power over suppliers and the nature of the supplier relationships, (model of Cooper and Slagmulder 
(1997)). Some of these characteristics are, however, discussed in another form. For example power 
over suppliers is expressed in bargaining power and the nature of the supplier relationships  is 
expressed in the willingness to share information and trust in the relationship. 
The factors in the second step, product strategy and characteristics of the product are, however, of 
interest, because these factors provide us with information on the nature and extent of information 
during the target costing process. The nature and extent of information are not only important when 
looking at target costing; they are also important when reviewing control in an inter-firm relationship 
(Van der Meer-Kooistra and Vosselman, 2000; Tompkins 2001; Hakansson and Lind 2004; Kamminga 
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and Van der Meer-Kooistra 2007). For these reasons I will review the characteristics of product 
strategy and the characteristics of the product in more detail. 
 
The Product strategy is a generic term which includes: number of products in line, frequency of 
redesign and degree of innovation. I will discuss each item in more detail and will review how these 
factors affect control. 
 
Number of products in line 
Cooper and Slagmulder (1997) talk about the number of products in line from a customer point of 
view, but a similar situation can be discovered when looking from a supplier point of view (outsourcer). 
The outsourcing company can outsource one, but also multiple products to a supplier (outsourcee). 
Sourcing different products from a single supplier will add complexity to the process due to an 
increase in physical, monetary and information flows. This complexity will also influence the control 
complexity as more products have to be monitored and controlled, but it also makes target costing 
more beneficial (Cooper and Slagmulder, 1997).  
 
Frequency of redesign 
The fact that target costing is beneficial in complex situations can also be traced back to the increase 
in the frequency of redesign (Cooper and Slagmulder, 1997). Due to the short life cycles firms are 
forced to produce highly profitable products in a limited timespan without wasting time to correct 
errors. Target costing can support this. Especially in the semiconductor industry where incorporating 
the latest technology is an important topic to satisfy customer requirements, redesigns are made even 
before products are brought to market. This increase in frequency of redesign will not only add 
complexity to the processes, but also adds complexity to control.  
 
Degree of innovation 
The degree of innovation helps us to understand how much historical cost information can be used for 
future costs estimates regarding new products. As the degree of innovation increases, the historical 
cost information becomes less valuable (Cooper and Slagmulder, 1997). From this it can be 
concluded that innovation is correlated with an amount of uncertainty which will result in more risk and 
attention to control.  
 
Characteristics of the product are also important factors which influence the product level costing step. 
These factors include: product complexity, up-front investments and duration of product development. 
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Product complexity 
The product complexity captures how difficult it is to manage the product design process (Cooper and 
Slagmulder 1997). In their model they assume that the product complexity involves:  
- the number of components in the product,  
- the number of distinct production steps required to manufacture it,  
- the difficulty of manufacturing the components it contains,  
- and the range of technologies required to produce them (Cooper and Slagmulder 1997).   
They argue that target costing is more beneficial when product complexity increases. This is due to 
the influence of target costing in the product design stage and to the possibility to make sure that the 
total component level costs do not exceed the targeted product level costs. These product 
complexities are, however, also associated with control complexity. Especially in the beginning of the 
relationships more time is spent on control to manage all variables, until a certain amount of trust has 
been developed. 
 
Up-front investments 
In their research Cooper and Slagmulder (1997) confirm that high levels of up-front Investments are 
associated with increased benefits deriving from target costing (Through cost reduction returns on 
capital investments are maximized). High levels of upfront investments may involve capital 
investments in research and development, tooling for production, investment in pilots and tests, but 
also investments in human assets (i.e. knowledge, skills, and experience). Although these human 
investments are more difficult to manage due to the fact that tacit knowledge is difficult to measure, 
these investments can be significant. These investments are often less valuable or not valuable at all 
outside the transaction relationship. For this reason they have to be made visible and monitored in 
order to make the appropriate business decisions and avoid bad investments or high switching cost. 
Next to the benefits which may derive from target costing these investments will increase the 
complexity of control. 
 
Duration of product development 
Duration of the product development process captures the time it takes to go from product conception 
to release to production (Cooper and Slagmulder, 1997). Duration tells us something about the risks 
which are involved in the product development process. Long term investments contain more 
uncertainty due to lower future predictability. It is also argued that when duration of product 
development increases, so does the complexity due to the interaction with the changes in the market. 
These risks play an important role when considering the benefits of target costing. Cooper and 
Slagmulder (1997) state that the longer the product development process, the greater the risk, and 
therefore, the greater the benefits of a more formal target costing process. Increase in duration will 
also result in additional and more complex controlling activities to safeguard the end product and its 
economic advantages. 
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The above mentioned transaction characteristics help us to separate the different kind of transactions 
which exist in practice. Based on these characteristics different types of relationships can be 
distinguished as will be discussed in section 2.2.3. 
 
Although the mentioned transaction characteristics help us to separate the different kind of 
transactions which exist in practice and their relation with target costing, the choice of control is also 
significantly influenced by relational characteristics. 
2.2.2 Buyer-supplier relational characteristics 
In the inter-firm relationship literature different relational characteristics models have been developed 
in order to study control in inter-firm relationships; joint ventures (Kamminga and Van der Meer-
kooistra, 2007); outsourcing, Langfield-Smith and Smith, 2003, alliances and networks, Tomkins, 
2001; Van der Meer-Kooistra and Vosselman, 2000). After reviewing these models the following 
relational characteristics have been selected in order to distinguish the different buyer-supplier 
relationships using target costing: 
- Information asymmetry 
- Bargaining power 
- Dependence & risks 
- Trust 
 
Information asymmetry 
Information sharing has been mentioned as a critical success factor for efficient supply chain 
functioning (Corbett et al., 1999; Dyer et al., 2001; Krause and Ellram, 1997). Not sharing (the right) 
information will lead to unnecessary costs due to incorrect product specifications (e.g. unnecessary 
use of expensive material) or incorrect logistical data (e.g. unnecessary inventory increases). 
Reasoning: not sharing the appropriate information will negatively influence the target costing process 
in order to reduce costs. Disclosure of data, however, has also been criticized due to the potential 
abuse of the disclosed information. This may lead to opportunistic behavior, which may cause 
appropriation concerns which in turn may prevent firms to achieve mutual objectives. Although 
disclosure of particular data can be arranged by contracts, when more information is shared additional 
controlling activities need to be in place to prevent opportunistic behavior. For off-the-shelf products 
information asymmetry seems to be less of a problem than for sophisticated products or not-standard 
products that need to be developed or produced. Development of goodwill trust can help to overcome 
information asymmetry between parties, reducing the risk of opportunistic behavior (Van der Meer-
Kooistra and Vosselman, 2000). 
 
Bargaining power 
Unequal bargaining power between two parties may also result in opportunistic behavior which will 
affect the controlling structure. This opportunistic behavior may come from the company with the most 
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bargaining power, but may also come from the company which is in an underdog situation in such a 
relationship. The company with the most bargaining power may pressure the company in the 
underdog position to reduce its desired prices levels, causing tension in the buyer-supplier 
relationship. McDonald (1999) states in this respect that power imbalances within a buyer–supplier 
relationship can lead to unproductive partnerships. In the long term the position of the weaker party 
will be eroded too much and the partnership will be destroyed. Of course in practice many companies 
suffer from differences in bargaining power, but to establish a long term relationship, in order to reduce 
cost, bargaining power has to be used carefully. Especially relationships where trust is an important 
factor do not benefit from abuse of bargaining power. However, without power imbalances the benefits 
of target costing are reduced, because suppliers are not forced to accept lower prices for their 
products (Cooper and Slagmulder, 1997). Therefore it is expected that in situations where bargaining 
power is intentionally used, target costing is used primarily to control prices by setting a targeted price 
without necessarily disclose all cost data. In relationships of trust, target costing is used to share 
objectives and to establish cost reduction programs in which cost disclosure is given in order to 
establish the targeted cost reductions. This openness of cost data will, however, affect the bargaining 
position and therefore a different form of control is needed compared to relationships which are 
determined by market conditions. 
 
Dependence & risks 
As said before in order to reduce cost and achieve common goals more effectively, firms are 
outsourcing more and more components and products to indepent firms. Although cost reduction can 
often be realized and common goals are achieved more effectively, these relationships also cause the 
firm to become more dependent on others. This dependence may involve opportunistic behavior with 
which a firm may aspire to safequard its own individual interest. Especially in situations where 
relationships are highly dependent on each other, control may be less tight than in situations with low 
dependency, to prevent that these controls harm the relationships. In situations with low dependency 
harming the relationship by tight controls is less likely to be an issue due to the low switching cost. 
However, these hybrid relations are characterized by incomplete contracting, as it is neither possible, 
nor practical to develop contracts that completely specifify all of the potential outcomes of the 
interactions between both parties (Baiman and Rajan, 2000). Das and Teng (2001) define these risks 
as relational risk and performance risk. They note that there is a critical difference between objective 
risk and perceived risk. Risk (or objective risk) is based on the consequences or outcomes of 
alternatives and their probabilities, while perceived risk is a decision makers’ estimate of the objective 
risk (Das and Teng, 2001). Although perceived risks, which may cause relationships tension, can be 
reduced by trust, the objective risks need to be secured by other forms of control (i.e. contracts, 
information sharing, outcome controls, etc). 
Interdependence is likely to be higher when firms closely collaborate to develop or  redesign new 
(complex) components and products based on their experience and expertise. For off-the-shelve 
components and products  interdependence is less likely.  
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Trust 
A relational characteristic receiving a lot of attention in inter-firm relationships is trust (e.g. Kamminga 
and Van der Meer, 2007; Dekker, 2004; Langfield-Smith and Smith, 2003; Tomkins, 2004; Van der 
Meer-Kooistra and Vosselman, 2000). Trust can be defined by the expectations that one firm has of 
another firm (Barber, 1983) or having confidence that the other firm will realize the expectations 
(Luhmann, 1979). Three kinds of trust are relevant for managing outsource relations: Contractual trust, 
Competence trust and Goodwill trust. “Contractual trust is based on the moral standard of honesty, 
and rests on an assumption that the other party will honour the agreement, whether the agreement is 
in writing or not (Sako, 1992, Van der Meer-Kooistra and Vosselman, 2000)” (Langfield-Smith and 
Smith, 2003. Page 285). This is the minimum trust condition which needs to be established when two 
parties want to collaborate. The second kind, competence trust, focuses on perceptions of ability, 
expertise and competence that expectations will be realized. This level of trust may be very important 
for a company in the semiconductor industry in order to cope with the product’s technical complexity. 
The last kind, goodwill trust, is “characterized by the willingness of both parties to go beyond the 
contract and act in the best interest of the other party, even at a slight short-term disadvantage to 
themselves” (Cooper and Slagmulder, 2004, page 19). 
 
The presence of trust between two cooperating firms is essentially important in situations 
characterized by uncertainty and strong dependencies (Das and Teng, 2001; Van der Meer-Kooistra 
and Vosselman, 2000). Although it is difficult to fully protect oneself against these risks by means of 
contracts, trust can mitigate these risks or reduce coordination cost in inter-firm relationships 
(Kamminga and Van der Meer-Kooistra, 2007). “In situations with low risk and little task 
interdependence, there is less of a need for trust“ (Kamminga and van der Meer-Kooistra, 2007, page 
134). Trust may develop over time through processes of learning and adaption, which are essential to 
strengthening the relationship between partners, making the relationship more durable in the face of 
conflict and encouraging interactions between partners involving knowledge exchange and promotion 
of each other’s interest (Johanson and Mattsson, 1987). 
 
2.2.3 Buyer-supplier transaction and relational characteristics from a control perspective 
The above transaction and relational characteristics in the context of buyer-supplier relations using 
target costing significantly influence how a firm may organize its governance structure in order to 
control its activities. This influence is not determined by each characteristic itself, but by all 
characteristics and their interaction. In order to study control in buyer-supplier relationships using 
target costing and to answer the central question in this paper different buyer-supplier relationships 
can be distinguished with increasing control complexity (see table 2.). Similar breakdowns were made 
by e.g. Kamminga and Van der Meer-Kooistra (2007) for joint ventures and   Cooper and Slagmulder 
(2004) for Buyer-suppliers.  
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 Buyer-supplier relations 
with low control complexity 
Buyer-supplier relations with 
medium control complexity 
Buyer-supplier relations 
with high control complexity 
Transaction characteristics 
 
Product strategy    
- Number of products in line One or few Few or many Many 
- Rate of change / frequency  
  of redesign 
Low Medium High 
- degree of innovation Low to medium Medium to high High 
 
Product characteristics 
   
- Product complexity Low Medium High 
- Asset specific / up-front  
  Investments 
Low to medium (physical 
and dedicated asset 
specificity) 
Medium (human and  
procedural asset specificity) 
High (human asset  
specificity) 
- Duration of product  
  Development 
None or short Short to long Long 
    
Target costing benefits Less likely to be used Likely to be used to reduce 
costs and align objectives 
Likely to be used to align 
objectives and share 
information 
    
Relational characteristics 
 
Information asymmetry  Limited information 
asymmetry  
Limited to medium 
information asymmetry  
Information asymmetry is 
reduce deliberately in order 
to stimulate collaboration 
 
Bargaining power  Exercised deliberately Exercised deliberately, but 
carefully 
 
Exercised very carefully 
Dependency & risk Low dependency;  low to 
medium objective risks 
dependency low to high; 
medium objective and 
relational risks 
dependency high; medium  
to high objective and 
relational risks 
 
Trust  Minimal trust condition: 
contractual 
 and competence 
Medium trust condition: 
contractual, competence, and 
goodwill 
High trust condition: 
contractual, competence, 
and goodwill 
    
Table 2. Different buyer-supplier relations using target costing. 
 
For less complex products or products with limited innovation (limited development time, low 
frequency of redesign, limited number of components) multiple resources (or suppliers) are expected 
in the market who can supply the requested products. Therefore high up-front investments are not 
expected, making these relationships less dependent on each other due to the limited switching costs. 
Due to the nature of the product, cost data of these products is often available on the market resulting 
in low information asymmetry between buyer and supplier. Taking the above dimensions into account 
uncertainty levels are expect to be low. Therefore the relationship between the buyer and supplier 
itself will probably receive less attention and trust is often limited to contractual and competence trust. 
For that reason bargaining power is often deliberately used to reduce cost. Only when multiple 
products are sourced from one (major) supplier the relationship itself may become more important. For 
these reasons target costing practices are expected to be less beneficial and used more limited when 
dealing with less complex products. When reviewing these relationships from a control perspective 
these relationships are expected to have a limited control complexity. 
 
An increase in the number of products in line and/or product complexity and/or duration of product 
development will, however, increase the benefits which can be obtained through target costing. This 
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complexity will, however, also increase the controlling activities to secure the different flows that 
surround these characteristics. Complex products often take more time to develop and will often 
contain multiple components which need to be aligned in order to deliver the end product timely, 
especially when the products are developed together with the supplier. In order to realize the target 
cost and deliver the products timely, timing and planning become important. Not mentioning the 
communication and information sharing which are needed to secure the process. Knowledge or 
intellectual property is often an important strategic instrument in order to be competitive and if not 
handled carefully may threaten the firm strategy and competitiveness due to opportunistic behavior of 
others. Not sharing, however, will lead to information asymmetry and inefficiency which may 
jeopardize the targets and relationship between the buyer and suppliers. To prevent information 
asymmetry firms may install tight control mechanism (i.e. legal contract) to prevent negative outcomes, 
but this will negatively influence the firm’s flexibility. Flexibility which is often needed to anticipate to 
changing customer demands and is not conducive to innovation. As long as processes, objectives, 
outcomes and responsibilities can be clearly defined everyone knows what he/she can expect, but 
when measurability becomes issues a good relationship between the buyer and supplier becomes 
critical. Goodwill trust is an important relationship characteristic to mitigate conflicts and tensions in the 
relationships, but is also an important characteristic in complex situations that cannot always be 
controlled by simple outcome controls. Reasoning from a control point of view these relationships can 
be characterized as relationships with medium control complexity.  
 
In situation where one or multiple (complex) products, containing many components, are outsourced 
to an external supplier, the relationship may become critical in the company strategy. Especially when 
part or most of the design is the responsibility of the supplier, the company may become dependent on 
an external independent firm, resulting in more uncertainty and risks. Flexibility and adaptation in 
these relationships may imply that control systems rely less on formal mechanisms, like outcome and 
behavioral controls (Gietzman, 1996; Ittner et al., 1999). These relationships are often long term 
relationships where trust has been developed over time through processes of learning and adaption, 
which are essential to strengthening of the relation between partners (Johanson and  Mattsson, 1987). 
Trust is important to make the relationships more durable in the face of conflict and encouraging 
interaction between partner, involving knowledge sharing and promotion of each other’s interest 
(Johanson and  Mattsson, 1987). It has also been argued that trust reduces the possibility of 
opportunistic behavior (Axelrod, 1984; Bradach and Eccles, 1989; Birnberg, 1998; Langfield-Smith 
and Smith, 2003). Preventing opportunistic behavior is important because these kinds of relations 
often include high up-front investment. Not necessarily capital investments, but investments in human 
knowledge which are needed to deal with the complex products, processes and procedures. Due to 
these large investments bargaining power is only used very carefully, because it could jeopardize the 
relation. When taking the above arguments in consideration a different control structure is needed to 
control these relations and its outcomes. Reasoning from a control point of few these relationships can 
be characterized as relationships with high control complexity.  
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2.2.4 Buyer-supplier control patterns 
In this section the management control characteristics of the three different types of buyer-supplier 
relations using target costing will be examined in more detail by using the model of Kamminga and 
Van der Meer-Kooistra (2007), adjusted to the context of this research. 
 
Although the model of Kamminga and Van der Meer-Kooistra was used to study control in joint 
ventures, joint ventures as well as buyer-supplier relations are both inter-firm relationships. In the 
literature these relations are also known as hybrid relations. These hybrid relations, in which each 
party preserves autonomy, are typically based on explicit, long-term contracts in conjunction with 
additional safeguards to assure compliance (Williamson, 1996; Speklé, 2001). The model used by 
Kamminga and Van der Meer-Kooistra (2007) consists of five control characteristics: Relationship 
type, Control focus, Tightness of control, contract type and control mechanism.  
The relationship type characterizes how partners approach the relationship and how important the 
relationship is to them in order to realize their (strategic) targets. It also tells us something about the 
duration of the relationship, because strategic partnerships are expected to exist longer than 
transactional relationships. Transactional relations, however, may transform into a (strategic) 
partnership in the future. 
With respect to focus of control Ouchi (1979) distinguishes different focus of control ranging from 
control on outputs and/or activities to focus on organizational context (Kamminga and Van der Meer-
Kooistra, 2007).  
 
The third perspective from which the buyer-supplier control is studied, deals with the tightness of 
control in the relationship. Tightness of control can be defined as to what extent control is exercised to 
manage the outsourced activities/relations. In transactional relationships, where trust is limited to 
contractual and competence trust, tight controls are often used to prevent undesired situations. Based 
on experience levels of trust can increase which will lead to less tight control measures. A similar 
development can be seen when reviewing how contracts are used. In the beginning of the relationship 
comprehensive contracts are often used to safeguard interests, but they become relatively less 
comprehensive when firms collaborate more and more due to the development of trust. Therefore less 
comprehensive contracts are expected to control activities in trust based relationships.  
 
In the past different control mechanisms have been developed for inter-firm relationships: joint 
ventures (Groot and Merchant, 2000; Kamminga and Van der Meer-Kooistra, 2007), buyer-supplier 
(Dekker, 2004), and outsourcing (Van der Meer-Kooistra and Vosselman, 2000). In the section below I 
will discuss the different buyer-supplier relationships and see how these models can be applied to this 
research. 
Transactional relations are used to transfer components or modules with little complexity from one firm 
to the other. These transactions are mainly influenced by market conditions and often involve multiple 
parties. Therefore little or no investments are needed to start these transactions and switching costs 
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are expected to be low, making these relationships less dependent on each other. Also the nature of 
the products in these transactions is expected to involve little complexity and information is expected 
to be more or less available in the market. Contract and competence trust are among the few 
conditions of trust to start these relations. To safeguard the interest of both parties and to avoid 
opportunistic behavior these transactions are often guided by comprehensive contracts. Therefore 
buyer-supplier relationships with little control complexity are mostly controlled by content or outcome 
based mechanisms as described by Kamminga and Van der Meer-Kooistra and Dekker. Taking the 
above characteristics into account the control pattern to safeguard these relations and activities can 
be described as a transaction-based control pattern (see table 3.).  
 
When product complexity increases and more investments are expected to be made, whether 
monetary capital or human capital, the control focus will shift from focus on delivery against design 
specification towards a more context oriented control mechanism. Not only the transaction itself is 
important, but also factors outside the transaction become important, like the relation and the 
transaction context. Especially when suppliers are expected to add value to the product design in 
order to reduce costs and reach the targeted cost level, more face-to-face consultation is expected in 
order to coordinate and safeguard complementary interests. Therefore the transaction environment 
becomes more or less uncertain and will reduce measurability, which will complicate control and lead 
to less comprehensive contracts (Kamminga and Van der Meer-Kooistra, 2007). In order to reduce 
opportunistic behavior a trustful atmosphere needs to be created which may result in a less tight 
control on outcome and content. However, behavioral controls as mentioned by Dekker (2004) or 
Bureaucracy-based control pattern as mention by Van der Meer-Kooistra and Vosselman (2000) or 
Context controls as mentioned by Kamminga and Van der Meer-Kooistra (2007) are not expected to 
completely replace the content or outcome mechanisms, but complement these controls or put less 
pressure on these controls. As described above multiple patterns can be recognized in order to control 
this relationship type. I chose to describe this pattern as partnership-based control pattern. 
 
Outcome and content controls may, however, be difficult to maintain when outcomes are highly 
uncertain or become more difficult to measure. In these situations much more emphasis is placed on 
social control patterns as mentioned by Dekker (2004) or trust based control patterns as mentioned by 
Van der Meer-Kooistra and Vosselman (2000). In both patterns trust is very important to deal with the 
uncertainty which these relationships encounter. Trust in these circumstances can therefore be 
described as the intention to accept vulnerability based upon positive expectations of intentions or 
behavior of others (Camerer, 1998). This outcome uncertainty also prevents comprehensive contracts 
to fully cover activities within these relations. Therefore goodwill trust needs to be established in order 
to deal with opportunistic behavior and conflicting interests the firms may encounter. I chose to 
describe this pattern as a strategic partnership-based control pattern. 
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On the next page, I developed three control patterns based on buyer-supplier relationships using 
target costing by integrating relationship types as defined in paragraph 2.2.3 with control 
characteristics. In the section below I will briefly discuss some of the dynamics which may apply to the 
patterns. 
 
 Transaction-based control 
pattern 
Partnership-based control 
pattern 
Strategic Partnership-based 
control pattern 
Transaction characteristics 
 
Product strategy    
- Number of products in line One or few Few or many Many 
- Rate of change / frequency  
  of redesign 
Low Medium High 
- degree of innovation Low to medium Medium to high High 
 
Product characteristics 
   
- Product complexity Low Medium High 
- Asset specific / up-front  
  Investments 
Low to medium (physical 
and 
dedicated asset specificity) 
Medium (human and  
procedural asset specificity) 
High (human asset  
specificity) 
- Duration of product  
  Development 
None or short Short to long Long 
    
Target costing benefits Low Medium to high Medium to high 
    
Relation characteristics 
 
Information asymmetry  Limited information 
asymmetry  
Limited to medium 
information asymmetry  
Information asymmetry is 
reduce deliberately in order 
to stimulate cooperation 
 
Bargaining power  Exercised deliberately Exercised deliberately, but 
carefully 
 
Exercised very carefully 
Dependency & risk Low dependency;  low to 
medium objective risks 
dependency low to high; 
medium objective and 
relational risks 
dependency high; medium  
to high objective and 
relational risks 
 
Trust  Minimal trust condition: 
contractual 
 and competence 
Medium trust condition: 
contractual, competence, and 
goodwill 
High trust condition: 
contractual, competence, 
and goodwill 
    
Control characteristics 
 
Relationship type 
 
Transactional  relationship Partner Strategic partner 
Focus of control Delivery against design 
specification 
Delivery against design 
specification and consultancy 
for re-design 
 
Delivery of product and 
relationship cooperation 
Tightness of control 
 
High Medium Low 
Contract type 
 
Comprehensive Less comprehensive Framework 
Control mechanism Content-based / outcome-
based / market-based 
Content-based / outcome-
based / context-based 
/behavioral based 
 
Context-based / social-
based /  trust based 
    
Table 3. Control patterns within buyer-supplier relations using target costing 
 
Relationships between buyers and suppliers which use target costing are not fixed and may easily 
transform over time.  When the number of products in line increases, when the products in the 
collaboration become more complex, when the maturity or the development stage of the products 
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changes and especially when the trust between the partners improves, we can see a  shift from an 
transactional relationship to a partnership  or even to a strategic partnership. A change in the 
relationship in the  opposite direction is also a possibility. This does not necessarily need to be caused 
to a decreased level of trust between the partners, but can also very well be a result of a changing 
business environment. For instance the sale of one or more products can be lower than expected or 
lower than in a previous period, or due to technological developments there is less complexity in the 
production. These can all be factors which cause companies to no longer share the same amount of 
interest or objectives, so that the relationship naturally changes from a partnership in the direction of 
transactional. These transformations, however, usually occur gradually over time. When a relation 
between a buyer and a supplier changes from transactional to more partner-like, a tight control often is 
no longer needed or practical and therefore may loosen. On the other hand when we see that the 
partnership between companies gets more transactional, the financial department of the buyer will 
want an increased level of control and the procedures will have to be tightened. Especially when 
external factors, like human interaction, changes in the business context,  and environmental 
uncertainty, interfere with the transaction itself, then more focus will be put on the context of the 
transactions, which may change as well. Al these external factors, like environmental developments 
may lead to an increase or to a decrease in uncertainty which may cause a shift in the control pattern, 
either from a partnership-based control pattern to a transaction-based control pattern, or from 
transactional to more in the direction of a partnership.  
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3 Research methodology 
Although research has been done to study control in buyer-supplier relationships and  target costing, 
no literature was found which studied control focusing exactly on buyer-supplier relationships using 
target costing. Since target costing is often used across the boundaries of the firm it is interesting to 
know how control is established in a buyer-supplier relationship using target costing.  
 
First a literature study was done to develop the model described in previous chapters. To test it the 
model had to be confronted with practice. Case research is a very suitable method for the description 
and explanation of complex phenomena within a real-life context in a single case or in multiple cases 
or areas which have not yet been studied extensively (Yin, 1984). To test the model I choose to study 
a single large case with multiple units of analysis (a nested approach, e.g. Yin, 1994). The single large 
case involves an international company with numerous inter-firm relationships. Some of these inter-
firm relationships were selected to collect evidence and to determine to what extent the model is 
consistent with practice.   
 
Due to time and budget restrains the procurement controller of the outsourcing company was asked to 
select six suppliers who were expected to fit the developed model. 
Two of the suppliers were expected to fit the Transaction-based control pattern, two suppliers were 
expected to qualify for the Partner-based control pattern and two suppliers were expected to qualify for 
the Strategic partner-based control pattern. All contacts from the selected suppliers were closely 
involved in outsourcing activities at the time of the interview or shortly before. All interviewees were 
approached by e-mail and phone asking whether they were willing to support this research. 
 
However, due to the long term relationship strategy of the Company only one supplier was selected 
who would qualify for the Transaction-based control pattern.  
Also one of the Strategic partner-based control pattern suppliers was approached several times by e-
mail and by phone without any response. Also when a second contact was given by the outsourcing 
company to contact this supplier, no response was given.  
A second supplier of the Strategic partner-based control pattern suppliers was located outside the 
Netherlands and due to some translation challenges when using the phone, questions were sent by e-
mail to the supplier. To prevent misalignment additional examples and options were included in that 
questionnaire. Also a brief explanation was given regarding the research by phone. 
This resulted in a total of four suppliers who were willing to confront our model with practice.  
 
All interviews were held during the second half of 2012 and lasted two to four hours and gave enough 
room for explanations and discussions (see table 4.). The interviews with suppliers were semi 
structured to leave room for in-depth questions, further explanations and discussions. Interviews were 
recorded electronically and transcribed afterwards. 
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Interviewees Data collection method Period of time 
Business Controller Sourcing Interview June, 2012 
Director Quality & Production Improvements  
and Industrial Engineering 
Interview June, 2012 
CFO Supplier A Interview November, 2012 
CFO Supplier B Interview October, 2012 
Controller Supplier C Interview November, 2012 
CFO Supplier D Questionnaire  March, 2013 
Table 4. Data collection 
 
In order to ensure that research results were valid and reliable, the following criteria have been taken 
into consideration: Construct validity, Internal validity, external validity and reliability.   
Construct validity refers to the extent to which a study investigates what it claims to investigate by 
accurate observation of reality (Denzin and Lincoln, 1994). To ensure construct validity in this 
research, making sure that data is collected properly, interviews were carried out by the researcher 
himself. Peers not co-authoring and key informants of the outsourcing company, located in the finance 
and purchasing departments (e.g business controllers, directors) have reviewed drafts of the research 
and data collection circumstances have been addressed. Also interviewees were confronted with the 
developed model after the interview to see if they could recognize and acknowledge the different 
relationship types in the model.  
To ensure internal validity the research framework derived from existing research in the field of inter-
firm relationships, target costing and academic research. Existing literature was not only used to 
identify and to study patterns in order to develop the model (design phase), but existing literature was 
also used during the data analysis phase to ensure causal relationships between variables and 
results. Although efforts were taken to ensure internal validity it is one of the main challenges for 
qualitative researchers (Silverman, 2006).  
External validity, to ensure generalizability, was taken into consideration by studying multiple cases 
within a large organization and by presenting context information like industry context, relationship 
context and company background. Generalizability, however, is always a challenge for qualitative 
researchers. According to Yin (1994), qualitative research does not allow statistical generalizability, 
however, analytical generalizability can be applied considering the number of units analysed.  
To ensure reliability  this paper gives information on how the research was conducted, and how 
interview results were presented. Also interviews were recorded electronically and transcribed 
afterwards using predefined answers (e.g. Low, Medium, High). 
According to Gibbert and Ruigrok (2010) and Yin (1994) the above actions support that research has 
been carried out carefully and that the research results were obtained according to academic 
standards.  
 
26 
 
Although during this validation no biased findings were found it became clear that one of the suppliers 
was not a direct supplier, but a supplier of a supplier. Since this relationship can also be classified as 
an inter-firm relationship, these results were included in the research.  
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4 Research results  
4.1 Company X 
The company selected to confront the developed control model with practice has billions of sales, 
employs more than 8000 employees worldwide, located in Europe, Asia and United States and 
manufactures products which are highly complex and which contain multiple modules and thousands 
of components. The market in which the company operates can be classified as highly volatile. To 
deal with the volatile environment the company places considerable efforts to control its operations by 
adapting operational excellence, including a world class finance approach. The implementation of 
operational excellence has made the company (financially) flexible to deal with the volatile 
environment. 
 
In order to produce its final product approximately 1500 suppliers are used to manufacture the final 
product. Most of the design comes from the company itself, some modules are designed by 
independent Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEM).  Although most of the design is done in-house 
many suppliers are stimulated and involved to look for continuous improvements or re-design based 
on their knowledge and expertise. Based on these characteristics the company distinguishes five 
different types of vendors:  
 Common Off The Shelve (COTS) 
 Build-to-Print (BtP) 
 Build-to-Print-plus (BtP+) 
 Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) white-box  
 Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) black-box 
 
Vendor types are mainly based on design characteristics (Design executor, design owner, co-design, 
redesign). 
 In order to control product cost, especially towards the future, the company has implemented target 
costing. Target cost are determined by interactions with key customers and translated into target cost 
for modules and components.   
 
To (re)design and manufacture technologically complex products effectively in a volatile and fast 
changing environment the company maintains intensive long term relationships with suppliers. In 
these relationships high upfront investments in human capital and monetary capital are common. And 
in order to reach common goals effectively information asymmetry has to be reduced. To do that, it is 
necessary that competence trust and goodwill trust are present. For this reason the company goal is 
to maintain long term relationships in which both companies benefit from the relationship. To manage 
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product costs effectively production volumes, improvements, design implications, redesigns and other 
forms of information, supplier days are organized to exchange information between the companies.  
 
Cost control for standardized and relatively cheaper materials is managed through setting of a 
percentage by which the costs have to be improved. In general these products are less sensitive to 
information asymmetry, to change, to redesign and to innovation. Large cost reductions are limited 
due to the open market and the fact that multiple suppliers are able to offer the products, who can add 
only limited extra value to the product. For these reasons and because of the fact that these products 
are often not in development any more, there is little point in using target costing. The company, 
however, is not looking for quick wins, but stimulates long term relationships and therefore cost 
reductions are mainly driven by consolidating volumes with a limited number of suppliers to reduce the 
impact of fixed cost (fixed costs or overhead costs become relatively lower when volume increases). 
These volumes are large enough to create some dependence in order to exercise bargaining power 
deliberately without creating too much dependence. Too much dependence will increase risk and may 
force the company to search for alternative solutions to reduce its supplier dependence. To control 
their dependence, goods obtained from one supplier are limited to a maximum of 25% of that 
supplier’s sales volume. More than the maximum of 25% of that supplier´s sales volume will create 
risk which company X wants to avoid. 
 
To answer the main question of this research suppliers from all categories, transaction-based, partner-
based and strategic partner-based were interviewed or questioned. In the following paragraphs the 
results are presented. 
4.2 Supplier A 
Supplier A is a leading industrial integrator for high tech, advanced electronics with annual sales close 
to 60 million euro and close to 200 employees located in The Netherlands, Belgium, Ireland, United 
Kingdom, Czech Republic, Poland and China. The company provides a wide variety of services to 
customers , such as outsourcing, procurement, logistics inventory and supply chain management for 
industrial components. Their prime objective is to help their customers achieve substantial, on-going 
integral cost reductions by consolidating their supply base and optimizing their supply and logistics 
configuration. Compared to company X products are relatively standard, less complex and more 
available on the market.  
 
During the financial crisis of 2008 company X had to reduce costs significantly. In order to reduce 
costs purchased volumes of standard off-the-shelve products were consolidated to a limited number of 
suppliers. One of these suppliers was supplier A who faced a sales increase of more than 1000% and 
which is currently managing more than 500 different products for company X (classified as: Many). 
Due to these occurrences the relationship between company X and supplier A became more intense. 
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The products delivered are less sensitive to redesign or to innovation and can be classified as 
products with little complexity. Also no high upfront investments are needed because products have 
reached a mature product phase. For these reasons target costing benefits are expected to be low 
and target costing therefore is not implemented. This was also confirmed during the interview. 
The number of products in line can, however, add complexity to the process which would make target 
costing more beneficial. This complexity was, however, limited due to the fact that the process was 
fully automated and logistic information is nowadays shared electronically.  
 
The fact that product information is available to both parties and the fact that information is shared 
electronically, prevent information asymmetry which was classified as limited.   
The increased volumes, mentioned earlier, also had a negative impact for supplier A when looking at 
the increased dependence on company X and the influence it can exercise through the bargaining 
power which is used to decrease prices. To prevent harmful situations  the supplier bi-annually 
analyses its customer dependency and takes appropriate actions when dependency may threaten the 
existence of the organisation. The following facts confirm these actions: Two years ago approximately 
25% of their sales came from company X. For this reason Supplier A increased focus towards 
customers in other market segments (i.e. medical, food). Supplier A also increased their value added 
services to make company X more dependent on supplier A (more lock-in). Due to these actions 
dependency and risk are expected to be reduced and are classified as low. 
Both companies have been working together for several years and during these years trust has grown 
beyond contractual and  competence trust. Although contractual and competence trust are still the 
most important aspects of the trust condition, goodwill trust is expected to be present due to their long 
term relationship and willingness to improve operations so both companies can benefit from their 
collaborations. 
 
From a control point of view the increased volumes have increased tightness of control which are 
mainly outcome-based and content-based related (i.e. logistical service level agreements and a quality 
agreement). Legal contract are used to secure these activities. 
 
Company X and supplier A have been working together for several years and a partnership relation is 
most likely to be established. However, every few years a request for quotation is sent out to similar 
suppliers to benchmark prices. Based on the benchmark and quotation the best supplier is selected. 
From this I conclude that the relationships should still be characterized as transactional although from 
their long term relationship a partnership-based relation would be more likely. 
 
Based on the above observations I classify this relationship type as transactional. Research results 
are summarized in table 5.  
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Transaction characteristics   
Product strategy  
- Number of products in line Many 
- Rate of change / frequency of redesign Low 
- Degree of innovation Low 
Product characteristics  
- Product complexity Low 
- Asset specific / up-front investments Low 
- Duration of product development None or short 
  
Target costing benefits Low (mainly volume related) 
Relational characteristics  
Information asymmetry  Limited information asymmetry  
Bargaining power  Exercised deliberately 
Dependency & risk Low dependency;  low to medium objective risks 
Trust  
Minimal trust condition: contractual  and competence 
limited goodwill trust 
  
Control characteristics  
Relationship type Transactional 
Focus of control Delivery against design specification 
Tightness of control High 
Contract type Comprehensive 
Control mechanism Content-based / outcome-based / market-based  
Table 5. Supplier A interview results summary  
4.3 Supplier B 
Supplier B is a Dutch manufacturer of inductive systems such as transformers, coils and  linear motors 
and this supplier is increasingly active in the field of electromagnetics. During the research no sales 
figures were mentioned or presented, but from the size of the company and employees we may 
assume it is a mid/size company with approximately 150 employees located in the Netherlands (two 
locations). Their primary objective is to manufacture value added systems with technical expertise and 
know-how. National and international customers can be found in a diverse range of sectors including 
semiconductor, air and space travel, electronic assembly, heating, air-conditioning and the medical 
sector.  
 
For decades supplier B delivered products with medium complexity to company X, but during the crisis 
of 2008 sales dropped dramatically due to the economic recession within the semiconductor industry 
and their sales dependency on company X (in 2008 approximately 30% of their sales came from 
company X). Confronted with these risks the owners had to decide whether to decrease dependency 
as a regular supplier or to become a strategic partner with more lock-in to prevent financial risks during 
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downturns. Due to their expertise, knowledge and their relationship with company X, the supplier was 
able to pursue more involvement in product development, redesign and innovation and the products 
delivered nowadays are highly sensitive for redesign and innovation to stay on top of technical 
leadership. Although these products are critically important for company X the number of products is 
still limited (less than ten). The transfer to be more involved in the product development phases have, 
however, also resulted in more upfront investment, capital and human intellectual involvement due to 
longer lead-times.   
 
The supplier also discovered that target costing was initially used at a higher level (building block 
instead of component) and in openness (deliberately reducing information asymmetry by sharing 
details product (cost) information) during product development. Only when the product became less 
sensitive to development, target costing became more important to reduce cost and align information. 
Although target costing is most beneficial during product development, in some cases of product 
development the cost component is less relevant than bringing the product to the market on time. This 
can be explained by the fact that company X wants to maintain a technical leadership position within 
its market segment.  
The fact that target costing is also used to share information more openly makes me conclude that 
information asymmetry is reduced deliberately to stimulate trust. The presence of trust between two 
cooperating firms is especially important to prevent opportunistic behaviour.  Sharing information will 
also help to align information between two cooperating firms which will positively influence control and 
collaboration.  
Bargaining power is used, but mainly to influence prices for standard products and/or relatively less 
complicated products. For new and more complicated products less power is used which can also be 
traced back to the margins on these products.  
The movement towards more involvement in the product development phase have increased the 
added value towards company X and reduced the risk that products can easily be sourced from a 
different suppliers. However the transfer has increased dependency, because in 2012 a surprising 
70% of their sales came from company X. Although risks are reduced by gain sharing, trust has 
become tremendously important due to their dependency. The fact that both companies are willing not 
to use some of their controls (limiting the goods obtained from one supplier to a maximum of 25% of 
that supplier’s sales volume, willingness to accept high upfront investment and willingness to pay for 
some high upfront investments without guarantees) leads me to conclude that trust is not limited to 
contractual and competence trust. The fact that they are willing to accept these risks (i.e. to perform 
some activities and making upfront investment without covering of legal documentation; or being 
dependent on one buyer with large sales) leads me to conclude that goodwill trust needs to be 
present.  
 
A similar discovery was made when looking at the control tightness during the development stages. 
Initially control was less tight during the initial product development stage, but it became more tight 
32 
 
during the stage in which the product became less sensitive to development. Whether this is done 
intentionally or to stimulate innovation is not clear, but competence trust and trust in the relationship 
seem to be necessary in order develop a satisfying product. For these reasons I classify tightness of 
control as medium during the mature product development phase and as low during the initial product 
development phase. Also the fact that not all activities in the development phase can be covered by 
legal contract confirms these findings. 
Observations are in line with the partnership relationship type although there are clear indications that 
supplier B is moving in the direction of a strategic partner relationship type. These indications are the 
increased involvement of supplier B in product development, increased information sharing, increased 
dependency and  increased trust . Research results are summarized in table 6.  
 
Transaction characteristics   
Product strategy  
- Number of products in line Few 
- Rate of change / frequency of redesign High 
- degree of innovation Medium to high 
Product characteristics  
- Product complexity Medium to high 
- Asset specific / up-front investments Medium to high 
- Duration of product development Long 
  
Target costing benefits Medium to high (depending on development stage) 
Relational characteristics  
Information asymmetry  Information asymmetry reduced deliberately in order to stimulate 
collaboration 
Bargaining power  Exercised deliberately, but very carefully 
Dependency & risk dependency high; medium  to high objective and relational risks 
Trust  High trust condition: contractual, competence, and goodwill 
Control characteristics  
Relationship type (Strategic) partner 
Focus of control Delivery of product and relationship cooperation 
Tightness of control Medium to low 
Contract type Less comprehensive, Framework 
Control mechanism Outcome-based / context-based /behavioral based / trust based 
Table 6. Supplier B interview results summary  
4.4 Supplier C 
Supplier C started decades ago as a s small local machine shop and is nowadays a global player in 
low volume , high complexity machining of functional, critical components and the assembly of fully 
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tested mechatronic systems. With approximately 300 employees located in the Netherlands 
(Headquarter), Turkey and Malaysia this supplier is servicing companies in the markets: 
- Aerospace and Defense 
- Semiconductor 
- Medical and Diagnostics 
- Industrial Automation 
  
The relationship with company X started decades ago as a regular supplier, but during the crises of 
2002 and 2008 the relationship became more intense. Currently it is supplying approximately 150 
different products to company X. Compared to the products of company X the complexity of the 
products of supplier C can be classified as medium although compared to market standards products 
are still highly complex. Products are produced according to product specifications designed by 
company X. Recently supplier C has become more involved in the early product development phase 
which makes the products more sensitive for redesign, innovation and upfront investments. Earlier 
upfront investments were limited to capital investments in advanced machinery, but due to their recent 
involvement in the product development stages, upfront investment in human capital has increased. 
This can also be linked to the extended involvement and duration. 
 
During the interview it also became clear that the supplier C is highly involved in the target costing 
process of company X. Target costing is used by company X to manage product costs and to align 
product information in order to effectuate their collaboration. In order to do so suppliers are requested 
to share detailed information on product development, product improvement and changes in product 
costs. Their involvement in target costing of company X was confirmed by the detailed knowledge 
which supplier C has on the target costing process and the way information is shared between the two 
companies. 
 
Target costing is not only used to control prices, but also to align objectives by reducing information 
asymmetry. Information sharing was said to be very important to manage operations and potential 
risks, while not sharing information may damage operations and the relationship. Information shared 
by company X is mainly volume and market related, while the information shared by supplier C is 
mainly cost related. It was mentioned, however, that both companies have to be willing to share their 
information without abusing it. This may explain why bargaining power is only used very carefully.  
Based on the facts that companies are willing to invest in both capital and human aspects, that 
movement is made towards early product development and that both companies are willing to share 
information which may lead to vulnerability, one can conclude that both companies have more trust 
then just contractual and competence trust. Goodwill trust is, however, limited because the supplier is 
still very actively managing customer dependency and agreements are repeatedly  laid down in 
contracts in order to decrease vulnerability. 
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Managing customer dependency is certainly not the only control supplier C has in place to safeguard 
operations. Tight control on logistics and production are maintained as well, although recently some 
controls were loosened to make sure deadlines are met. For example when a product needs to come 
to the market faster than can be achieved in the normal process, company X can ask a supplier to 
speed up the production process even before new underlying contracts are available. This also 
confirms the trust they have, although legal contracts are still commonly made for most of the 
activities. 
 
Based on the above observations I classify this relationship type as partner. Research results are 
summarized in table 7. 
  
Transaction characteristics   
Product strategy  
- Number of products in line Few 
- Rate of change / frequency of redesign Medium 
- degree of innovation Medium  
Product characteristics  
- Product complexity Medium 
- Asset specific / up-front investments Medium 
- Duration of product development Medium 
  
Target costing benefits Medium 
Relational characteristics  
Information asymmetry  Information asymmetry reduced deliberately in order to stimulate 
cooperation 
Bargaining power  Exercised deliberately, but very carefully 
Dependency & risk dependency low to high; medium objective and relational risks 
Trust  Medium trust condition: contractual, competence, and goodwill 
Control characteristics  
Relationship type Partner 
Focus of control Delivery against design specification and consultancy for re-design 
 
Tightness of control Medium 
Contract type Comprehensive, but may not cover all operations anymore 
Control mechanism Outcome-based / context-based /behavioral based / / limited goodwill 
trust 
Table 7. Supplier C interview results summary  
4.5 Supplier D 
Supplier D is a Swedish manufacturer of Micro Electro Mechanical Systems (MEMS). With a revenue 
of approximately Euro 36 million  and approximately 140 employees the company can be categorized 
as a midsize company.  
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The relationships with company X was establish several years ago and both companies acknowledge 
that the highly value their relationship with each other and view their relationship as strategic.  
Although supplier D only supplies a very limited number of products indirectly to company X (supplier 
D delivers its products to a supplier and it is not a direct supplier of company X). Products are, 
however highly critical for company X, because for supplier D these products represent a large part of 
their annual sales and for company X these products are highly important for a well-functioning of their 
customer products. Although volumes are limited the products are highly complex and take 
considerable effort to produce them. (high yield loss). Products are sensitive to redesign and 
innovation, but are more and more stable and redesigns are decreasing. High upfront investment are 
needed in order to produce these products, mainly because it takes several years to develop them.  
Information about target costing is limited due to the answers which were provided in the 
questionnaire. However, after discussing the subject with one of the contacts at company X it became 
clear why target costing is not accepted by supplier D. Parts designed and manufactured by supplier D 
are also assembled at supplier D based on a specification designed by company X.  This design is 
highly complicated resulting in low production yields. Due to the fact that part of the design comes 
from company X themself resulting in low production yield, supplier D does not accept that target 
costing is being used, although efforts are undertaken to improve production yield. 
 
Information sharing is used in order to reduce information asymmetry and stimulate collaboration. 
Although no exact information was given about the kind of information. Bargaining power is, however, 
used by company X, but very carefully and without damaging the relationship. Relationship damage 
would expose both companies to considerable risk and financial risks. In order to stimulate trust and 
share potential losses the supplier receives certain financial guarantees from company X. The fact that 
this is done leads me to concluded that (goodwill) trust is essential in this relationship. 
Although the products are highly important for both companies no additional or exceptional controls 
are installed. Regular controls are, however, tightly controlled in order to safeguard operations. When 
the supplier was asked: What kind of contracts are needed to safeguard operations, the answer was 
“Just purchase order”. 
 
Above observations lead me to conclude that the relationship needs to be classified as strategic 
partnership. Research results are summarized in table 8. 
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Transaction characteristics   
Product strategy  
- Number of products in line Few 
- Rate of change / frequency of redesign Medium 
- degree of innovation Medium 
Product characteristics  
- Product complexity Medium 
- Asset specific / up-front investments High 
- Duration of product development Long 
  
Target costing benefits Not used to reduce cost 
Relational characteristics  
Information asymmetry  Information asymmetry reduced deliberately in order to stimulate 
cooperation 
Bargaining power  Exercised deliberately, but very carefully 
Dependency & risk dependency high; medium  to high objective and relational risks 
Trust  High trust condition: contractual, competence, and goodwill 
Control characteristics  
Relationship type Strategic partner 
Focus of control Delivery of product and relationship cooperation 
Tightness of control Low to high 
Contract type Framework 
Control mechanism trust based 
Table 8. Supplier D interview results summary  
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5 Implications and Conclusions  
5.1 Implications on findings 
The confrontation of the empirical findings with our theoretical model leads to the following 
implications: In general all researched relationships largely fitted in the transactional and (strategic) 
partnership-based control patterns. Supplier A fitted in the transactional-based control pattern, 
Supplier B and C fitted the (strategic) partnership-based control pattern and supplier D fitted the 
strategic partnership-based control patters. In table 9 research results are consolidated in one table. 
 
The case findings confirm that target costing is less extensively used in transactional-based control 
patterns. The reason why target costing is not used in this pattern can be traced back to the 
matureness of the product, product information and availability on the open market. Due to these facts 
comparison between suppliers can easily be established by either benchmarking or sending out 
requests for quotations. Forces in the open market will pressure suppliers to decrease prices and 
search for better and/or cheaper alternatives making target costing less interesting to be used. 
 
Considering the cases which were described as (strategic) partnership-based control patterns some 
interesting findings were found as well. In line with earlier research target costing is used to remove 
communication barriers (Feil, 2004), manage cost (i.e Cooper and Slagmulder, 2004) and sourcing 
activities (i.e Weber, 1999) more effectively. In addition I found that deliberately sharing product 
information by using target costing stimulates trust and optimizes collaboration. The last mentioned 
finding has received less attention so far, although it is important when companies want to develop 
new products and want to maintain long-term relationships. To maintain long term relationships 
goodwill trust is important because both companies have to be willing to help each other in order to 
deal with some of the forces between companies and with the volatile market sector. Stimulating trust 
by deliberately decreasing information asymmetry with target costing will help to stimulate and 
increase goodwill trust which is essential to maintain long term relationships in uncertain situations 
and volatile markets. This research confirms these findings. 
When developing new products goodwill trust is especially important in dealing with the unknown 
variables (i.e. effects ) and frequency in redesign. These occurrences often prevent that everything  is 
captured in written or in legal documentation.  Especially in the early stages of product development 
where frequency of redesigns is often high, tight control may be desired in practice to deal with the 
uncertainties. Tight control, however, may be counterproductive with innovation. Especially in a 
technical leadership environment where time to market can be more important than managing the 
initial product costs, goodwill trust needs to be present. This finding is in line with the research of  
Transaction characteristics Supplier A Supplier C Supplier B Supplier D 
Product strategy     
- Number of products in line Many Few Few Few 
- Rate of change / frequency of  
  Redesign 
Low Medium High Medium 
- Degree of innovation Low Medium  Medium to high Medium 
Product characteristics     
- Product complexity Low Medium Medium to high Medium 
- Asset specific / up-front  
  Investments 
Low Medium Medium to high High 
- Duration of product development None or short Medium Long Long 
     
Target costing benefits Low (mainly volume related) Medium Medium to high (depending on 
development stage) 
Not used to reduce cost 
Relational characteristics     
Information asymmetry  Limited information asymmetry  Information asymmetry reduced 
deliberately in order to stimulate 
cooperation 
Information asymmetry reduced 
deliberately in order to stimulate 
collaboration 
Information asymmetry reduced 
deliberately in order to stimulate 
cooperation 
Bargaining power  Exercised deliberately Exercised deliberately, but very 
carefully 
Exercised deliberately, but very 
carefully 
Exercised deliberately, but very 
carefully 
Dependency & risk Low dependency;  low to medium 
objective risks 
dependency low to high; medium 
objective and relational risks 
dependency high; medium  to 
high objective and relational 
risks 
dependency high; medium  to 
high objective and relational 
risks 
Trust  Minimal trust condition: contractual  
and competence 
Medium trust condition: contractual, 
competence, and goodwill 
High trust condition: contractual, 
competence, and goodwill 
High trust condition: contractual, 
competence, and goodwill 
     
Control characteristics     
Relationship type Transactional Partner (Strategic) partner Strategic partner 
Focus of control Delivery against design specification Delivery against design specification 
and consultancy for re-design 
Delivery of product and 
relationship cooperation 
Delivery of product and 
relationship cooperation 
Tightness of control High Medium Medium to low Low to high 
Contract type Comprehensive Comprehensive, but may not cover all 
operations anymore 
Less comprehensive, 
Framework 
Framework 
Control mechanism Content-based / outcome-based / 
market-based / limited goodwill trust 
Outcome-based / context-based 
/behavioral based / limited goodwill 
trust 
Outcome-based / context-based 
/behavioral based / trust based 
trust based 
Table 9. Suppliers interview result 
Nooteboom (2004), who states that under high volatility of technology and markets the need to find 
other forms of control is greater than detailed legal contracting and integration (Nooteboom, 2004). 
 
In contrast with the developed model we found that the importance of the characteristic number of 
products in line for the control characteristics is not supported by the studied cases. During the 
interviews, however, it became clear that the product development stage has impact on the designed 
control patterns. Although the development stages are partly recognizable in the variable rate of 
change, the frequency of redesign and the degree of innovation, it would be helpful to incorporate the 
product development stage in the developed model to improve transparency and to show the link 
between product development and control (see table 10). 
 
Another interesting finding is that two cases in particular showed some of the dynamics which occur in 
practice. Some transaction and relationship characteristics of supplier B were aligned with the 
strategic partnership-based control pattern although the control characteristics were more in line with 
the partnership-based control pattern. These observations can be explained by the fact that this 
supplier is moving towards the strategic partnership-based control pattern. These findings were also 
confirmed by the supplier and the outsourcing company, company X.  
Also when reviewing supplier D, who is still a strategic partner, transaction characteristics are not in 
line with the strategic partnership-based control pattern. These observations can be explained by the 
fact that the products of supplier D are reaching a mature development stage which could indicate that 
products may become less strategic and that their relationship is more likely to move towards a 
partnership-based control pattern.  
Above observations do not reject the developed model, but confirm how relationships change over 
time and how they move between the different patterns in the developed model. These dynamics are 
supported by the developed model. 
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 Transaction based control 
pattern 
Partnership based control 
pattern 
Strategic Partnership based 
control pattern 
Transaction characteristics 
 
Product strategy    
- Stage of product development Mature product(s) Mature product(s) and 
product development 
Early product development 
- Rate of change / frequency  
  of redesign 
Low Medium High 
- degree of innovation Low to medium Medium to high High 
 
Product characteristics 
   
- Product complexity Low Medium High 
- Asset specific / up-front  
  Investments 
Low to medium (physical 
and 
dedicated asset specificity) 
Medium (human and  
procedural asset specificity) 
High (human asset  
specificity) 
- Duration of product  
  Development 
None or short Short to long Long 
    
Target costing benefits Low Medium to high Medium to high 
    
Relation characteristics 
 
Information asymmetry  Limited information 
asymmetry  
Limited to medium 
information asymmetry  
Information asymmetry is 
reduce deliberately in order 
to stimulate cooperation 
 
Bargaining power  Exercised deliberately Exercised deliberately, but 
carefully 
 
Exercised very carefully 
Dependency & risk Low dependency;  low to 
medium objective risks 
dependency low to high; 
medium objective and 
relational risks 
dependency high; medium  
to high objective and 
relational risks 
 
Trust  Minimal trust condition: 
contractual 
 and competence 
Medium trust condition: 
contractual, competence, and 
goodwill 
High trust condition: 
contractual, competence, 
and goodwill 
    
Control characteristics 
 
Relationship type 
 
Transactional relationship Partner Strategic partner 
Focus of control Delivery against design 
specification 
Delivery against design 
specification and consultancy 
for re-design 
 
Delivery of product and 
relationship cooperation 
Tightness of control 
 
High Medium Low 
Contract type 
 
Comprehensive Less comprehensive Framework 
Control mechanism Content-based / outcome-
based / market-based 
Content-based / outcome-
based / context-based 
/behavioral based 
 
Context-based / social-
based /  trust based 
    
Table 10. Revised control patterns within buyer-supplier relations using target costing 
5.2 Conclusion 
To answer the main thesis of this research: How is control established in a buyer-supplier relationship 
using target costing? By conducting a literature study on inter-firm relationships and target costing a 
theoretical model was developed. The model contains transaction, relation and control characteristics 
mainly based on existing literature. Based on the research of Cooper and Slagmulder (1997) costing 
benefits were identified and integrated into the model. 
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To test the model it was confronted with practice by conducting one large case study including multiple 
units of analysis (embedded case studies). By analysing the obtained results and reviewing the results 
from different perspectives conclusions were extracted and presented by the researcher.  
This research confirms that relationships in practice largely fitted in the transactional and (strategic) 
partnership-based control patterns. Another interesting finding is that target costing in practice can 
stimulate openness by deliberately reducing information asymmetry resulting in more alignment in the 
collaboration which will positively influence control. 
Also the product stage seems to influence how control is established in relationships using target 
costing.  
 
Finally  the researcher concludes that control in inter-firm relationships using target costing changes 
gradually over time. This research provides valuable information about some of these elements which 
influence these inter-firm relationships and the dynamics when using target costing.  
5.3 Limitations and implications for future research 
Although the developed model will hold true in circumstances similar to the context described in 
previous chapters, the scale of this research is limited and more research needs to be done to see 
whether the model holds true in other circumstances (i.e. in other firms and in other markets).  
 
Interviewees in this research were selected and approached due to their relationship with the 
researcher’s contacts at company X. They were not selected based on their specific knowledge on 
inter-firm relations or on target costing. The researchers, however, expects that they have a good view 
on the information which is needed to answer the thesis question or have contacts who can help 
them.. 
 
During the research interviewees found it difficult how to define control, especially the variable 
tightness of control needed more attention to clarify. This became clear when interviewees were asked 
how tightly they control their activities/relationships. At first most interviewees answered that the 
control was tight, but when questioning further it became clear that tightness of control was mainly 
associated with logistical and technical controls. No association with the relationship or its context 
were mentioned. More in depth questions were needed to clarify the association of tightness of control 
with focus of control. These additional questions, however, improved construct validity of the obtained 
results.  
 
Also the numbers of redesign or degrees of innovation or the amount of upfront investment were not in 
scope of this research. These figures would, however, provide more inside knowledge into how these 
affect the relationship and control mechanism. 
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Last but not least the product development stage seems to influence control in inter-firm relationships. 
For this reason including product development stages in my model would add valuable information 
how control is establish in inter-firm relationships. 
 
This research is based on a single case study including multiple units of analyses (embedded) and 
relies entirely on what the researcher reported. In order to improve results validity and reliability, 
repetition and additional research is desired. Future research may consist of repetition of this research 
in other circumstances; clarification on tightness of control (how its measured and how measurements 
should be interpreted); additional research on the actual numbers of redesign, degrees of innovation 
and the amount of upfront investments and additional research how the product development stage 
influences control in inter-firm relationships. 
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